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BANKS AND BANKING-NATIONAL BANKS-ASSESSMENT OF STOCKHOLDERS
-The complainant, by reason of a debt owing to it, brought a bill in equity 1
to assess stockholders of a national bank which had gone into voluntary liquidation. Since some of the stockholders were outside the jurisdiction, and were
not before the court for assessment, the question involved was to what extent
the defendants before the court were liable. The Federal Reserve Act provides: "The stockholders of every national banking association shall be held
individually responsible for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, each to the amount of his stock therein, at the par value thereof, in
addition to the amount invested in such stock."' The defendants relied on an
Act of 1864, which is similar to the Federal Reserve Act, except that it provides,
in addition, that the stockholders shall be liable "equally and ratably, and not
one for another."" The special master held that the earlier act of 1864 was
not repealed" and that the stockholders' liability had to be apportioned "equally
and ratably, and not one for another." The complainant excepted to this on
the ground that such assessment would not raise the entire amount due. Held:
The defendants to be assessed to the full extent of their liability under the
FederalReserve Act which repealed the Act of 1864' (as to liability of stockholders). First Nat. Bank in Eureka v. First Nat. Bank of Eureka, 14 Fed.
(2d) 129

(D.C. Kan.

1926).

There do not appear to be any other adjudicated cases on the question presented by the principal case, but a comparison of the above quoted acts seems
to leave no doubt that the decision is correct and that the Federal Reserve Act
was intended by the legislature to replace the earlier Act as a yardstick by
which liability of stockholders was to be measured. The result reached is inevitable inasmuch as Congress has failed to provide a method whereby all the
stockholders could be brought before one court. The defendants, of course,
are left with the right to enforce contribution from the non-resident stockholders not before the court.
'The procedure which a complainant must follow will be found in the Act
of 1876, ig Stat. 63, U. S. Comp. Stat. (918) § 9807.
238 Stat. 273 (913),

U. S. Comp. Stat (x918)

§9689.

'The entire provision as to liability is as follows: "The shareholders of
every national banking association shall be held individually responsible, equally
and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts and engagements
of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the
par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares." U. S.
Rev. Stat. (1878) § 515.
'The Federal Reserve Act provides for the repeal of inconsistent laws, as
follows: "All provisions of law inconsistent with or superseded by any of the
provisions of this Act are to that extent, and to that extent only hereby repealed."

38 Stat. 274 (I913), U.

S. Comp. Stat (1g18)

§ 9803.

'It is interesting to note that in the margin of the Federal Reserve Act,
supra, note 2, there is the following notation by the editor: "R. S. § 5151
amended." This is the result reached by the court.
'So held in the principal case.
(267)
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CONTRACTS-UNII.ATERAL CONTRACTS-WHEN CONTRACT COMES INTO ExISTENCE-The plaintiff sues on defendant's promise to pay him six thousand dol-

lars for procuring a mortgage loan. This sum is in excess of the compensation
provided by the Usury Act,' which is set up as a defense. After plaintiff
started work on the loan but before it was secured the act was repealed. The
lower court decided that the Act had been repealed before a contract existed
and defendant appeals. Held: A contract came into existence when the plaintiff started work on the loan, and therefore he is subject to the Act. Grossman
v. Calonia Land and Improvement Co., 134 AtI. 740 (N. J.1926).
It appears that the unilateral contract has presented a situation that many
courts have failed to consider properly. It is practically axiomatic that, in order
to create a contract, there must be an acceptance to meet the terms of the offer.'
Yet the court here held that a contract existed in the principal case before
the Usury Act was repealed despite the fact that at this time the plaintiff had
not secured the loan. It would seem that the court thereby disregarded the
rules of contract law since the plaintiff did not perform the act specified in defendant's offer. It is submitted that the rationale of the court in supporting
this conclusion is also erroneous. They reason that as soon as the plaintiff
started negotiations a bilateral contract was created, placing upon the plaintiff
the obligation of "using reasonable diligence and skill in effecting the loan."'
As a matter of fact plaintiff made no promise to use reasonable skill or diligence and to assume that he did is a fiction. Furthermore, it is well settled
that until the plaintiff performs the act requested by defendant's offer he is
under no obligation whatever and may stop performance if he so desires.4 It is
true that a number of courts in other jurisdictions have ayailed themselves of
the fiction employed by the New Jersey Court. In these cases, however, a
different question was precipitated, namely, the right of an offeror to withdraw
his offer after the offeree has partly performed. Such cases often result in
such hardship and injustice to the offeree that the court indulges in the fiction
in an effort to make the best of a situation in which the law is admittedly
inadequate. In the principal case, however, there is not even this stimulus for
what appears to be so great a departure from good law and sound reason.

CONSTITUTIONAL

INDUSTRIAL

LAw-KANSAs

COURT-REGULATIONS

OF

STmixEs-The defendant and another official of the United Mine Workers of
America called a strike of member coal miners in the employment of a Kansas
Fuel Company to compel the company to pay a disputed but unarbitrated claim
of $i8o.oo to a former employee. The men struck and did not return to work
until after the claim was paid. While the men were out on strike this criminal
14 N. J. Comp. St. 1910, p. 5706.

'Minneapolis and St. Louis R. R. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, ng U. S.
149 (1886); Wittwer v. Hurwitz, 216 N. Y. 259, n1o N. E. 433 (i915).
'Grossman v. Calonia Land Improvement Co., 134 Atl. at 742.
'I WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS, (19o4) § 6o.

'Bloomenthal v. Goodal, 89 Calif.

251,

26 Pac. 9o6 (i891) ; Miller v. Moffat,

App. I (i9io) ; Loyd v. Long, 123 La. 777, 49 So. 521 (1909).
153 Ill.

'Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a Counter Prom-

ise, 23 HARv. L. REv. 157 (91o).
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proceeding was begun under the provisions of the Kansas Court of Industrial
Relations Act.' The defendant was convicted of inducing a strike in violation
of sections i7 and ig of the Act. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Kansas. Thereupon the defendant sued out a writ of error in the
Supreme Court of the United States, contending that section ig as applied was
void because it prohibits strikes, which is a denial of the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: Judgment of the state court affirmed.
Dorchy v. Kansas, U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. T. 1926, No. sig.
The principal case is primarily interesting in that it is the first decision of
the federal judiciary passing upon the power of a state to prohibit the right
to strike. It is to be noted, however, that the Court did not consider the broad
question of the power of a state to prohibit strikes but only of the power of
the Kansas Legislature under the facts of this case to prohibit a strike. The
affirmation of the power under these conditions was anticipated from the declarations of the Court in certain recent decisions," especially in Wilson v. New,'
which seemed to indicate that the right to freedom of contract and labor, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment was subject to limitation when employ-"
ment was accepted in a business charged with public interest. However, the
decision in the principal case is not based on the affectation of public interest
in the mining of coal but rather on the necessity of strikers having a lawful
purpose" for quitting their employment so as to justify the tort committed by
interfering with the right of their employer to a free flow of labor,' which
if not justified results in a violation of a property right' It is submitted that
the court in the principal case in requiring a lawful purpose to justify the
strike and in holding that the facts of this case did not constitute such a pur'Kansas Laws, I92O, ch. 29.
'Sec. 17, while reserving to the individual employee the right to quit his
employment at any time, makes it unlawful to conspire to induce others to quit
their employment for the purpose and with the intent to hinder, delay, limit or
suspend the operation of mining. Sec. x9 makes it a felony for an officer of a
labor union wilfully to use the power or influence incident to his office to ifiduce another person to violate any provision of the Act.
'Kansas v. Howat, 112 Kan. 235, 2IO Pac. 352 (19=).

'Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (i92i); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 256 U. S. i7o (i92i).
'See 243 U. S. 332, 352 (1917).

'See Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S.

522,

542 (923).

'It is submitted that the purpose of strikes held justifiable is to settle some
trade dispute personally affecting the rights of the strikers; while the purpose of
strikes held not justifiable is to affect the rights of a third party who is not
immediately concerned in the competition between the strikers and their employer. Under the first class fall strikes that have as their purpose the securing
of better hours, wages, or working conditions. Willcut & Sons Co. v. Driscoll,
200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897 (907).

Under the second class fall strikes to

compel a stranger not to deal with the employer of the inducers of the strike,
against whom they are striking. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 41 U. S. 172
(1921) ; see 30 YALE L. J. 280, 404, 501 (192J).

"O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. io8 (905)
Theatre v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, ii8 N. E. 671 (i918).
'King v. Weiss, 266 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 6th, i92o).

; Haverhill Strand
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pose followed the reasoning of previous federal decisions" and various state
holdings." The Kansas Act, therefore, as applied to the facts of this case is
but a restatement of the common law and judicial legislation of the courts of
this country, regulating the right to strike, despite the alarm expressed by some
of the commentators on the Act.

EQUITY-VENDOR'S

LIEN-CoNDITIONAL SALE-DEFICIENcY DEck-The

plaintiff made a conditional sale of personal property to the defendant, reserving title in himself until payment of the purchase price, and granting immediate possession to the defendant. The contract provided that if the defendant
defaulted in any condition, the plaintiff had the right to retake possession of the
property, consider the contract as terminated, and treat all payments as forfeited in full satisfaction of damages. The defendant defaulted, and the plaintiff, proceeding in equity, claimed a lien on the property. Held: The vendor has
an equitable lien. Malone v. Meres, log So. 677 (Fla. 1926).
This decision is founded on the theory that the vendee in a conditional sale
is the beneficial owner, with the vendor holding the legal title as trustee, thereby
giving the vendor a lien on the vendee's equitable estate to insure payment of
the purchase price.' It is submitted that the courts upholding the doctrine of
the principal case are assuming fallacious jurisdiction. A court of equity has
no jurisdiction of a case if there is an adequate remedy at law. In the case
at bar, the vendor has two adequate remedies at law, viz., a suit for the balance of the purchase price on the contract, or an action to recover the property
with a forfeiture of the payments made as liquidated damages.' There is
therefore no necessity for an extension of equity's jurisdiction. Moreover, the
result of this decision is to grant the vendor a lien on his own property, thus
"Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194 (19o4); Hitchman Coal and Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917); Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. 8o3
(S. D. Ohio, 1894) ; United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 698 (N. D. Pa. 1895);
Wabash Ry. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563 (E. D. Mo. 1903).
'State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769 (igo4) ; Pickett v. Walsh,
192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (19o6); Bausbach v. Reiff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 At.
224 (1924) ; Nat. Protective Ass'n v. Cummings, 17o N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 398
(1902).

' See Dean, The Fundamental Unsoundness of the Kansas Industrial Court
Law, 7 A. B. A. J. 333 (1921); Report of the Executive Committee of the
American Federation of Labor, 27 AmEIwcAN FnunATIONisT, 627 (1920);
Wickersham, Recent Extensions of State Police Power, 54 Am. L. REv. 8oi
(19m).
'Aycock Lumber Co. v. Bank, 54 Fla. 604, 45 So. 5Ol (19o7). Accord:
Ballinger v. West Publishing Co., 44 App. D. C. 49 (915) ; Wolf Co. v. Hermann Savings Bank, i68 Mo. App. 549, 153 S. W. IO9 (1912); Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Leipzig, 113 N. Y. Supp. 916 (igo8). Contra: United States v.
Montgomery, 289 Fed. 125 (D. C. Ariz. 1923); Ahrend v. Odiorne, ii8 Mass.
261 (1875) ; Heist v. Baker, 49 Pa. 9 (I865).
'Mizell Live Stock Co. v. McCaskill, 59 Fla. 322, 5I So. 547 (910);
Ratchford v. Cayuga Storage Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447 (1916); Winton Motor Co. v. Broadway Auto Co., 65 Wash. 65o, 118 Pac. 817 (1911). See
also 70 U. OF PA. L. REV. 338 (1922).
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creating a legally impracticable situation, since the vendor, having title and the
right to possession, procures no rights under the lien he would not otherwise
have. It is also submitted that the statute' on which the court relied does
not apply to the situation arising in conditional sales. A conditional sale does
not create a mortgage, for the vendee has no legal title to convey defeasibly.'
Since the parties in their contract stipulated two methods of satisfaction in
case of default, it would seem that the court, in creating the lien, did so needlessly and in violation of the expressed intenion of the parties.
Not only did the court permit the plaintiff to foreclose on his lien and purchase the property at a low figure, but also granted a deficiency decree for the
balance of the purchase price. Such a decree is granted in all jurisdictions upholding the equitable lien theory.' The results attending this decision are not
only absurd but unjust, when viewed from the equitable standpoint. The vendor in the intant case found himself in absolute possession of the personal
property, retained the two thousand dollars paid by the vendee, and in addition was granted a deficiency decree against the vendee for ten thousand dollars. Moreover, the court in granting this decree acted in complete contradiction of the terms of the contract and the intention of the parties, for the
contract provided that in case of default, the retention by the vendor of the
payments made would be considered as full liquidated damages.' This example
of inequitable equity is another indication that the theory of equitable liens,
as applied to conditional sales, would seem to be not only illogical but in absolute
derogation of the fundamental principles of equity.
EvmENcz-ADmssmIuT OF EvIDENcE OF NoN-Accass-The plaintiff
claims land as the illegitimate son and heir of the intestate, who generally and
"notoriously" recognized him as a son. The plaintiff's mother, at the time of
his birth, was the intestate's servant and married to another. The mother's
testimony, which the trial court refused to admit, showed non-access of her
husband at any time within which the conception of the child was possible.
Held: The evidence of non-access is admissible. Lynch v. Rosenberger, 249
Pac. 682 (Kan. 1926).

It is now generally conceded that the conclusiveness of the presumption
that a child born of a married woman during wedlock is the child of her then
3 Any instrument in writing selling or conveying real or personal property
for the purpose of securing payment of money, whether from debtor to creditor
or debtor to third person in trust for creditor, shall be deemed and held a mortgage and that mortgage is a lien and not a conveyance of legal title or right of
possession. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. (I92O) §§ 3836, 3837.
'American Soda Fountain Co. v. Blue, 146 Ala. 682, 40 S. E. 218 (19o6);
Mizell Live Stock Co. v. McCaskill, supra, hote 2; Nichols v. Ashton, i55
Mass. 205, 29 N.

E. 519 (i892).

'Gigray v. Mumper, 141 Iowa, 396, ii8 N. W. 393 (1909); McDaniel v.

Chiaramonte, 6i Ore. 4o3, 122 Pac. 33 (1912); Campbell Printing Press v.
Powell, 78 Tex. 53, 14 S.W. 245 (1890). See also cases in note I, supra.
'3 JONES, MORTGAGES (915) § 171.
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husband is relaxed,' so that non-access during the period of gestation, and
other evidence showing the impossibility of the husband's being the father is
admissible! But it is accepted as settled law in the courts of England and
most of the United States, that parents cannot "bastardize their issue" by testifying to non-access.' This rule was first enunciated obiter by Lord Mansfield.'
Though the dictum was pure invention and had no authority in the law of
England, it was accepted with unquestioned faith and by singular process became firmly established in the law of evidence.' Statutes abolishing the disqualification-by-interest of the testimony of husband and wife, have not changed
the rule,' for this disqualification affords no ground on which the rule is to be
supported. It is self-evident that if the ultimate purpose of rules of evidence
is to establish the most sagacious and certain means of discriminating truth
from error, there should be no artificial restriction on the admissibility of
relevant evidence without sound reasons. Even a casual examination of the
support of the rule given at its inception--"decency, morality, and policy" shows that it is artificial and false.' The rule has been so frequently criticized
and denounced by analytical investigators,' that the only inquiry that the prn11 JONES, EVIDENCE, (2d ed. 1926) § 68; THAYER, CASES, EVIDENCE, (Maguire ed. 1925) 58, note. For concise summary of effect of the presumption see
note, 33 HARv. L. REV. 3o6 (1919).
'Banbury Peerage Case, i Sim. & Stu. 153 (Eng. I81I); Rex v. Luff,
8 East, 193 (Eng. i8o7) ; Wright v. Hicks, I5 Ga. i6o (1854) ; Gors v. Froman, 89 Ky. 318, 12 S. W. 387 (1889), note in 8 L. R. A. ioz; Dennison v.
Page, 29 Pa. 420, 425 (1857); State v. Shaw, 89 Vt 121, 94 Atl. 434 (1915).
'Bullock v. Knox, 96 Ala. 195, I1 So. 339 (1892); Nolting v. Holt, 113
Kan. 495, 215 Pac. 282 (1923), annotated in 3 A. L. R. i17 (husband and wife

white, child mulatto).

"Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 117 S. W. 842 (915);

Taylor v. Whit-

tier, 24o Mass. 514, 138 N. E. 6 (1922) ; Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige Ch. 39 (N. Y.
i84o) ; Tioga v. South Creek, 75 Pa. 433 (1874) ; State v. Flynn, i8o Wis. 586,
193 N. W. 65i (923).
DENCE (6th ed. 1921)

The English cases are summarized in PHrpsoN, Evi-

198. A recent English case extended the rule to apply
to divorce proceedings, Russell v. Russell, [1924] A. C. 687.
Goodrich v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591 (Eng. i777).

'See the "singular" story of this rule in 4 WidmoRE, EVIDENCE, (2d ed.
1923) §§ 2o63, 2o64, and concise summary in ig IL. L. REV. 280 (1924).
'Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245, 248, 6 N. W. 654, 656 (i88o) ; Chamberlain v. People, 23 N. Y. 85, 88 (1861) ; Tioga v. South Creek, supra, note
4, at 437.
'Supra, note 5.
'Why is it "indecent'" to allow the parent to testify to non-access when
in the same action a wife may testify to adultery with others? Kennedy v.
State, supra, note 4. Why is it "immoral" when other's testimony may prove
the same thing? Is it "policy" to have the same law make the stain of bastardy indelible, and censure parents for the abomination of testifying to that
bastardy?
"See HOOPER, ILIEGITImAcY (1911) 217, and Cat Parents Give Evidence
to Bastardize Their Issue, 26 LAW QUART. REv. 53 (I9IO). Professor Wigmore
is most caustic in his denunciation, WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, note 6. See criticism
in ig ILL. L. REV., supra, note 6; 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71 (1924); 25 HAV.
L. REv. 746 (1912) ; 37 HARV. L. REv. 916 (1924) ; 24 COL. L. REv. 430 (1924).
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cipal case gives rise to is as to whether the reinstating of the original law,
changed by a misunderstood but adhered to dictum-itself nothing but judicial legislation-is an abuse of the judicial function. Although in fixing the
status of property, the common welfare is best served by the court's strictly
following the rule of stare decisis,' "considerations of policy that dictate adherence to existing rules where substantive rights are involved apply with diminished force when it is a question of the law of remedies:" It is therefore
submitted that the reversal of the ill-considered rule is in accord with sound
legal policy." To ascertain the truth of paternity an action is instituted, pleadings framed, trial had and evidence heard. Can it be proper, because of a
false and antiquated rule, to exclude that evidence which better than any other
can demonstrate the truth of the issue?

INSURANcE-STATE

LICENSING

OF

AGENTS-THE

CHRYSLER

FIRE

AND

PoLicy-The plan of the Chrysler Sales Corporation 1 for a blanket
insurance policy executed in Michigan and covering all the automobiles sold by
Chrysler dealers on time payments has finally been brought before the Supreme
Court for determination. The contract caused much litigation in the lower
courts on the question whether it violated state laws requiring that insurance
agents selling insurance in the state be licensed. The lower Federal courtsI
with some dissent, decided that the Michigan contract was merely a contract
for future insurance, and that dealers in Chrysler cars were in reality selling
insurance without a license. The -bases of these decisions seem to have been:
(I)that a contract of insurance is "personal" and does not attach to property,
and (2) that the insurance contemplated under the contract did not come into
being until a sale to a retail purchaser, because before that time no existing
risk was covered. The legal soundness of both of these premises is questioned
and their tenability denied.
On October 25, 1926, the Supreme Court by Holmes, J., decided in Palmetto Insurance Co. v.Conn, and other connected cases, that the Superintendent
of Insurance of Ohio was justified in revoking the liceise of the appellant insurance company because the latter was selling insurance in Ohio through
THEYT

'Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 416 (1924).
=CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,

(1921)

I56.

" . . . the rules of evidence are not wholly fixed and arbitrary, but are
still to be regarded as in a period of flux to the extent that changes, both judicial and legislative, may be expected from time to time as common sense
dictates. The rules in the last analysis are but applications of common sense and
judicial experience to the particular problem of determining issues in legal
tribunals." JONES, op. cit. supra, note I, § 5.
"For a statement of the facts see The Chrysler Fire and Theft Policy, 74
U. oF PA. L. REv. 491 (i926).
'An enumeration and criticism of these cases may be found in the article
referred to in note I.
'The Chrysler Plan of Fire and Theft Insurance, 35 YALE L. J. 989
(1926) ; The Chrysler Fire and Theft Policy, supra, note I.
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unlicensed agents. The decision rests on the ground that the obligation, although arising from a contract made in Michigan, became effective upon the
performance of acts in Ohio, and since the co-operation of the law of that
state was necessary to the obligation imposed, the state could insist upon its
right to tax. The Court does not decide the nature of the contract made-in
Michigan, holding this immaterial. And it is interesting to note that the decision does not so much as mention the questions raised below whether a contract
of insurance is personal only, and whether the covering of an existing risk
is essential to the existence of such an agreement. Having decided the point,
the Court refused to indulge in dicta, disappointing those who expected a decision of the interesting problems raised below.

QUAsI-CoNTRACrS---MIsTAKE

OF

FACT-BA.ANcE

OF

FAULT-The plaintiff,

induced by the fraudulent representations of one A, sent the defendant a check
drawn to the latter's order, which defendant endorsed and cashed, taking it
from A, the messenger, in the belief that it was intended as payment of A's
debt to the defendant. On the faith of this check, the defendant delivered
certain goods to A which cannot now be recovered without loss. The plaintiff
now sues to recover the money on the theory that it was paid under a mistake
of fact. Held: Recovery allowed. R. E. Jones, Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd.,
[1926] A. C. 670.

The obligation to repay money paid under a mistake of fact is quasi-contractual and based on the equitable theory that it would be unconscientious to
retain it.' Recovery, therefore, is generally permitted where the defendant has
not irrevocably altered his position in reliance on the payment;' accordingly,
where there has been such a change, the action fails. Where, however, the
mistake is wholly or to the greater extent the fault of the defendant, it will be
no excuse to show an irretrievable change of position. A conflict in the decisions arises when, as in the principal, case, there is a balance of blame or both
parties are equally blameless. In England and New York recovery has been
allowed' These decisions have been roundly condemned by text-writers, and
the majority of jurisdictions in this country deny relief. 7 It is interesting to
note that although the early English decisions confined the defense of irre'Costigan, Change of Position as a Defense in Quasi-Contracts,20 HARv.
L. REv. 205 (i9o6) ; KEENER, QUAsI-CoNRAcrs (1893) 66.
'Lawrence v. American National Bank, 54 N. Y. 432 (1873); Phetteplace
v. Bucklin, 18 R. I. 297, 27 Atl. 211 (1893).
'Crocker-Woolworth Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Calif. 564, 73 Pac. 456
(1go3) ; Behring v. Somerville, 63 N. J. L. 568, 44 Atd. 641 (1899) ; Boas v.
Updegrove, 5 Pa. 516 (1847).
'Union Bank v. United States, 3 Mass. 74 (18o7) ; Phetteplace v. Bucklin, supra, note 2.

'Durant v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, 6 Q. B. D. 234 (188o); Kingston
Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391 (1869) ; Bank of Toronto v. Hamilton, 28 Ont.
5I (Can. I898).
"Costigan op. cit. supra, note I; KEENER op. Cit. supra, note I; WOODWARD,
QUAsI-CONTRACTS

(1913)

§ 25.

See cases cited supra, note 3.
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vocable change of position to cases where there had been payment to a principal or cestui que trust," recently the doctrine of estoppel has been' invoked
to mitigate the rigors of this position, where the plaintiff was the principal contributor to the mistake.' In the principal case, two of the five judges, in dissenting, were of the opinion that the plaintiff should be denied recovery on
principles of estoppel. It is submitted that the doctrine of estoppel cannot
properly be applied to the instant case because the blame was equal (the jury
so found). The dissenting judges no doubt felt that the retention of the money
was not inequitable. There being a balance of fault, it would appear that the
equities were equal. Legal title to the money was clearly in the defendant.
Applying the equitable maxim that where equities are equal the law must prevail, we arrive at the conclusion that the majority lost sight of equitable principles in permitting a recovery.

SEARCH AND SEizURE-THE EFFECT oF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

SEARCH

AND SEIZURE UPON A SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE FOR A DIFFERENT PURPoSE-A raid

was made on the petitioner's home by officers who had no search warrant Over
the petitioner's protest his home was, searched and some intoxicating liquor
found in it was seized. Shortly thereafter the court made an order that the
liquor be returned to the petitioner, from which order the Government took
no appeal. While the marshal was causing the liquor to be transported to the
petitioner's home, it was seized by a.Collector of Internal Revenue for nonpayment of taxes. Held: The second seizure was void. In the Matter of the
Petition of E. L. Morgan, U. S. D. C., N. D. Calif., Div. I,Nov. 1, 1926.
The first seizure here, after an illegal and unreasonable search, was void
because it was made in plain violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.1 Accordingly, the
court ordered the seized liquor returned to the petitioner, thus following the
present weight of authority. Most of the cases which have adopted this principle have arisen as criminal actions in which the illegally seized property has
been excluded as evidence against the person whose constitutional rights have
been invaded, and have gone no further than to exclude the illegally obtained evidence and return it to the owner.' The instant case is somewhat imique in that,
because of its facts, the court was obliged to take a further step.
'Baylis v. Bishop of London, [1913] i Ch. 127; 3 WI.LISTON, CONTRACTS
(Ig9=)

§ I595..

'Holt v. Markham, [1923] I K. B. 504; Deutsche Bank v. Beriro, 73 L. T.
669 (i895). See 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. i8o (923).

'Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 2o (1925) ; United States v. Madden,
297 Fed. 679 (D. C. Mass. 1924).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.383, (I14); Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U. S.385, (i919). For bther cases, briefly annotated, see

THORPE, PROHIBITION AND INDUSTRIAL ALCOHOL (1926) 1384.
'Supra, note 2, to which may be added the two recent cases of Lee v. United
States, 14 Fed. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. ist, 1926) and Hancock v. State, 248 Pac.

1115 (Okla. 1926).

For an interesting, exhaustive discussion of this doctrine

and cases under it see 4 WiGomRE, EviDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2183, 2184.
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In order to give practical effect to its first decree this court held the second seizure void, despite the fact that it was made for tax purposes and not
for the purposes of the first seizure. The decision was based on the reasoning that knowledge improperly obtained, in violation of constitutional guarantees, may not be used for any purpose. Though no authority is cited in the
opinion, it is submitted that the court had in mind the words of Justice Holmes,
in the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case:' "the essence of a provision forbidding
the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all."
Certainly such language is authority for the decision in the instant case.

TAXATIoN-CAPTAL STOCK TAX-NON-DEucTILE AssErs-The defendant, a domestic corporation, in its capital stock return, required of it by statute,1 deducted from its total taxable assets the par value of the stock of
a foreign corporation, all of the shares of stock of which were owned by the
defendant Held: Such deduction was not permissible. Commonwealth v. Sunbury Converting Works, 286 Pa. 545, 134 At. 438 (1926).
The rationale of the principal case is that the Pennylvania capital stock
levy is, in effect, a tax upon the property in which the capital is invested,
such as real estate, bonds, mortgage and shares of stock? Through the tax
on the capital stock, therefore, the state cannot reach property which it cannot
tax directly,' such as capital invested in government bonds,' and property permanently located outside the jurisdiction.5 But the state, through its taxing
power may properly tax shares of stock of a foreign corporation in the hands
of residents,' it being universally recognized that the property of the shareholders in their respective shares is distinct from the assets which the corporation itself owns.7 And, since it is well established that a corporation is an

"Supra, note 2. The case held that neither a corporation's papers, illegally
seized, nor copies thereof could be used as evidence against the corporation.
'Act of July 22, 1913, P. L. 9o3, 9o5, Pa. Stat. § 2o366, amending Act of
June i, 1889, P. L. 42o, § 21.
'Commonwealth v.Standard Oil Co., ioi Pa. iig (1882); Commonwealth
v. Shipbuilding Co., 271 Pa. 403, 114 At. 457

(192).

'New York v. Tax, etc., Commissioners, 2 Black, 620 (U. S. i862) ; Bank
Tax Case, 2 Wall. 2oo (U. S. 1864); Delaware, etc., IL R. v. Pennsylvania,
198 U. S. 341 (19o5) ; Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., supra, note 2.
'Bank Tax Case, supra,note 3.
'Delaware, etc., R. R. v. Pennsylvania, supra, note 3; Commonwealth v.
Standard Oil Co., supra, note 2; Commonwealth v. Shipbuilding Co., supra,
note 2.

'Hawley v. Madden, 232 U. S. I (1913); Bellows Falls Power Co. v.
Commonwealth, 222 Mass. 51, iog N. E. 894 (1915); Dupuy v. Johns, 26i Pa.
40, IO4 Atl. 565 (1918) ; Callerly's Appeal, 272 Pa. 255, ii6 At. 222 (1922).
'Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 (U. S. 1865) ; Farrington v.Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 686 (1877) ; Greenleaf v. Morgan County, 184 Ill. 226,
56 N. E. 295 (I9OO); State v. Branin, 23 N. J. Law 484 (1852); McKeen v.
Northampton County, 49 Pa. 519 (I865).
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entity distinct from its individual members and stockholders,8 the fact that one
person owns all of the stock does not make him and the corporation one and
the same person Therefore, although the capital stock levy taxes the defend-

ant's ownership of-the stock, it does not reach the assets of that corporation;
and so, by the disallowance of the deduction claimed, nothing is being taxed
through the guise of the capital stock tax which Pennsylvania could not lawfully tax directly.
Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., which the principal case
expressly overrules, was the basis of the defendant's contention in the instant
case, that, since it owned all of the shares of stock of the corporation, it thereby
became the owner of the corporate property and assets. By such a view, then,
the capital stock tax being a levy upon the property in which the capital was
invested, to tax the capital invested in the shares was to tax the corporate
assets which such shares represented. It would then follow that such a result
was taxing property permanently beyond the jurisdiction, which was violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."
The holding of the principal case harmonizes the decisions in Pennsylvania on this general question, and, it is submitted, soundly so, for the result
is the inescapable logic of taxing any of the shares of stock of a foreign
corporation in the hands of a resident. In recognition of that, the principle
of the overruled case was discarded before the case itself was actually rejected.'

TAXATiON-IcoME TAX--GAINS FROm UNLAwFuL BUsINEsS-The defendant, in filing his income tax return, stated his sole income to be a salary of
$io,ooo yearly as officer of a certain corporation. In fact, his income was
$5oo,ooo, and was obtained from the sale of liquor in violation of the National
Prohibition Act. Held: The income was taxable. Steinberg v. United States,
14 Fed. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
The decision in this case raises a nice question. If the government can tax
'Van Allen v. Assessors, supra, note 7; Bank v. Winchester,

1i9

Ala. i68,

24 So. 351 (1898); Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N. Y. 462,

39 N. E. 490 (1895); Commonwealth v. Bridge Co., 216 Pa. io8, 64 At. 909
(i9o6) ; Callerly's Appeal, supra, note 6.
'Bank v. Macon Construction Co., 97 Ga. 1, 25 S. E. 326 (1895); Winona
R. R. v. St. Paul R. R., 23 Minn. 359 (877); Bidwell v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry.,
U14 Pa. 535, 6 At. 729 (1886) ; Bridge Co. v. Traction Co., 196 Pa. 25, 46 AUt.
99 (Igoo); Commonwealth v. Bridge Co., supra, note 8; Macan v. Belting Co.,
264 Pa. 384, 107 AU. 750 (1919).
"Delaware, etc., 1. R. v. Pennsylvania, supra, note 3.
" Commonwealth v. Shenango Furnace Co., 268 Pa. 283, iO At. 721
(i92o), where a domestic corporation, owning all the shares of stock of another domestic corporation, not subject to the capital stock tax because its
assets were permanently located beyond the jurisdiction, was not permitted a deduction for that stock. See Callerly's Appeal, supra,note 6, where a resident natural person was taxed for his ownership of stock in a foreign corporation which
was sole owner of the stock of a domestic corporation not subject to the capital
stock tax. In Washburn Co. v. Bliss, 42 R. I. 32, 105 Atl. 179 (1918), the
doctrine of Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. was expressly rejected. In accord with the principal case see Commonwealth v. Brill, 287 Pa.
59, 134 At. 441 (i926).
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the profits gained from "bootlegging," can it also tax the profits of the highwayman, the paid gunman, the prostitute and the host of others who engage
in criminal commerce? Before that can be answered, the meaning of the term
"income" must first be ascertained. Income has been defined by statute,1 by
the United States Supreme Court,' by economists' and by text-writers, but
none of the definitions specifically covers profits gained through illegal transactions. A comparison of the income tax laws shows that in the law of 1913 "
the statute provided for "a tax on gains from any lawful business carried on
for gain or profit." In the law of igi6,' the word "lawful" was omitted, and
the omission continued in the 1918,' 1921,8 and 1924' laws. This would seem to
indicate that Congress intended to make "stealings" and "winnings" taxable as
well as "earnings." 0 It has been held in the United States ' and in England "
that the earnings of a professional bookmaker are taxable. Where the gambling was for sport, England has held the iniome not to be taxable." Canada,
in a case on all fours with the principal case, decided the income was not taxable. 1 The income from embezzlement has been considered not to be taxable,
because it would be taxing profits gained from a "larceny." ' None of the
courts have differentiated between the various kinds of crime, and this seems
to be the cause for their confusion. An example of this is the opinion of
- "'Gross income includes gains, profits and income derived from . . . pro-

fessions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce or sales . . . or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever." 42 Stat. 238 (i92i).
"'Incomemay be defined as a gain derived from capital, from labor or from
both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through sale
or conversion of capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920).
'"Income is receipts by the taxpayer of money, or money's worth, growing
out of the productive process, and actually realized after deducting all necessary
cost of acquisition." Hewett, The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation, 33
J. POL. EcoN. 177 (1925). "Thieves and swindlers are parasites . . . Their
activity is purely predatory. . . . The keeper of a dram-shop and the gambler
are productive laborers." I TAussIG, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNoMICs (3d ed. i921)
c. 2, § 3. See Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509
(1921).

""Income is the amount of actual wealth which comes to a person during a
given period of time other than as a mere return of capital." HOLMES, FEDERAL

TAXES (6th ed. i925) 487. See Kix M zLER AND BAAR, U. S. TAX GUIDE
(i26) § 129; MONTOaMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (9th ed. i925) 490.
'38 Stat. 167 (1913).

'39 Stat. 757, U. S. Comp Stat. (1918) § 6336b.
40 Stat. io65 (1919).

'Supra, note I.
943 Stat. 267, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1925) § 6336 1/6 ff.
MILLER AND BAAR, op. cit. supra, note 4, at § 299; MONTGOMERY, op.

" Kix

cit. supra, note 4, at § 537.
'James P. McKenna, i B. T. A. 326.
Partridge v. Mallandaine, i8 Q. B. D. 276 (1886).
" Graham v. Green, [1925] 2 K. B. 37, 39 HARv. L. REV. 274 (i925).
" Smith v. Minister of Finance, 2 D. L. R. 1137 (Canada, 1925), commented
upon in Commerce Clearing House Rewrite Service, Fed. Tax. Bull., 13, § 5269
(1925).

"Rau v. United States, 260 Fed. 131, 136 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1919).
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Judge Manton in the principal case, which, while concurring with the majority,
dissented in several particulars. He drew an analogy between a highwayman
and a bootlegger, and contended that the income from neither could be taxed.
But there would seem to be a distinction. Highway robbery is a crime inalum
T
in se, ' whereas "bootlegging" is merely a, ialurn prohibitum, and it is submitted that the decided cases in the United States can only be reconciled by use
of such a classification. While the courts have hesitated to make this distinction,' it nevertheless seems to be the basis of their decisions and was suggested
in one of them."

TORTs-LIABILITY OF MAKER TO THIRD PARTY FOR DErin PRoDUCtThe plaintiff's intestate was killed in the collapse of the Knickerbocker Theatre
in Washington. The declaration, to which the defendant demurred, alleged that
the defendant had contracted to design, fabricate, furnish, and install the structural steel to be used in the roof and balcony of the theatre; that it was the duty
of the defendant to use reasonable care and diligence in the carrying out of the
contract; and that, because of the defendant's carelessness and negligence, the
roof and balcony of the theatre fell and caused the death of the plaintiff's intestate. The theatre had been accepted and maintained by the owner. Held:
Demurrer sustained. Ford v. Sturgis, 14 Fed. (2d) 253 (Ct. of App., D. C.
1926).
While the court might have rested its decision on the failure of the plaintiff's declaration to allege specific negligence, yet it preferred to base its holding
on the broader ground of non-liability for negligence of manufacturers to third
parties not in privity of contract. The court recognizes four exceptions to this
rule:' (I) when an article of a manufacturer or vendor is imminently dangerous
to human life and health, and negligence is committed in the preparation or sale
of the article the primary use of which is to serve, destroy, or affect life and
health; (2) when an owner has invited third parties to use defective machines
furnished by him; (3) when a manufacturer knows of, or has concealed, a
defect which will render the machine imminently dangerous to the one using it
for its intended purpose; and (4) when the article'or structure is a nuisance
per se. Cases on the liability of manufacturers and contractors to third parties
not in privity of contract with them have fallen into three classes. The first,
the old rule, is that of Winterbottom v. Wright' which holds no liability except
See 16 C. J. s8.
" Commonwealth v. Adams, i14 Mass. 323 (873).
'Fort v. Brinldey, 87 Ark. 400, 112 S. W. 1084 (1908).
For distinction between nialum prohibitum and inalum in se see Commonwealth v. Adams, supra, note 16.
"James P. McKenna, supra, note ii.
'Accord: Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 12o Fed. 865 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1903) ; Hruska v. Parke, Davis Co., 6 Fed. (2d) 536 (C. C. A. 8th,
For
1925) ; Heizer v. Kingsland Mfg. Co., xiO Mo. 6o5, 19 S. W. 630 (1892).
complete annotation of liability of manufacturers to third parties not in privity
of contract with them, see 17 A. L. R. 672 (1922).
2 ioM. & W. iop (Ex. 1842).
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to those in contractual relations. The next and most prevalent class of cases
is that of the principal case. The third and more modern class has grown out
of the confusion in respect to the first exception. Some courts in accord with
the principal case restrict the first exception to articles of themselves dangerous.
Other courts include in this exception articles which may become eminently
dangerous if defective, although the duty under both views is to take reasonable
care to guard against defects, and knowledge of the specific defect is not
required. New York has taken the lead in the latter view,' and definitely bases
the liability on a tort duty, which is of great antiquity.4 Much of the conflict
in decisions has been due to a misunderstanding of Winterbottom v. Wright,
which decided merely that a third party could not sue on a contract to which he
was not a party, not that a tort obligation did not also exist.' Other reasons
given by the principal case and its class of cases, for restricting liability to
articles of themselves dangerous, is the danger of endless suits, lack of foreseeability of the injury, and the danger of leaving the question of reasonable
care to the prejudice of juries.' But it is submitted that the New York view is
not only logical, but has been found to be practical and just. The principal case
illustrates the inconsistency of not holding the present defendant liable for his negligence especially when cases hold liability under the first exception of the principal case where the article is considered inherently dangerous,-automobile wheels,'
foods," beverages,' iron stoves,"' saw frames," and soaps." However inconsistent
with these cases the principal case may seem, the decisions are practically unanimous in not holding the constructor of a building after it has been accepted by
the owner." The principal case is another decision strengthening the authority
of the second classes of cases, and shows the unwillingness of the federal courts
to adopt the growing New York view, although it seemed at one time as if they
might.
'MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 11i N. E. 1050 (I916);
Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. i9, i95 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1922), 71 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 184 (923).
'The obligation of one engaging in a business or trade to exercise it competently. Y. B. 3 Hen. VI. 36 pl. 33 (0425) (millwright) ; Y. B. 2o Hen. VI.
34 pl. 4 (I442) (carpenter).
'See criticism in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926), 76-80.
'For discussion of, and answers to these reasons, see supra, note 5, at 127
et seq.
'Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 8oi (C. C. A. 2d, 1915);
Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047 (ig1).
'Ketterer v. Armour, 247 Fed. 921 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
'Coca-Cola Co. v. Barksdale, i7 Ala. App. 6o6, 88 So. 36 (ig2o).
" Coakley v. Prentiss, 182 Wis. 94, 195 N. W. 388 (1923), 9 CORN. L. Q. 494
(924).
"Davidson v. Montgomery Ward, i7I Ill. App. 355 (1912).

"Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, i5i S. W. 576 (Tex. C. C. A. 1912).
"Salliote v. King Bridge Co., 122 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Canal
Const. Co. v. Clem, x63 Ark. 416, 26o S. W. 442 (924) ; Curtin v. Somerset,
140 Pa. 70 (891).
" See Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, supra, note 7.
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER-WRITTEN CONTRACTS-EFFECT OF CLAUSE ExCLUDING ALL REPRnsaiNTA'oxs-The defendant vendor orally represented that
the rooms in the house in question were in a certain condition, and that the
income from rents was a certain amount. These statements were false. The
plaintiff vendee, relying upon these statements, decided to purchase the property
and entered into a written agreement which made no reference to the above
representations, but which contained the following clause: "No representation,
agreement or promise has been made except as herein stated." Upon subsequent discovery of the false representations, the vendee brings a bill in equity
to rescind the contract. Held: Vendee bound by the written agreement. Sullivan v. Roche, Supreme Jud. Ct. of Mass., Oct. 13, 1926.
It is a general rule that provisions in a contract for the sale of real estate
or personal property the purpose of which is to secure from the vendee in
advance a waiver of or an estoppel against any claim of fraud by the vendor or
his agent in securing the contract, will not be given effect to preclude the former
from setting up or relying upon such fraud order to rescind the contract or
avoid liability thereunder 1 It is held that the clause excluding representations
has reference to the subject matter of the contract, and not to representations
fraudulently made to induce and bring about its execution. If, therefore, the
representations are fraudulent there is nothing to prevent the introduction of
evidence of the fraud and the rescission of the contract.1 The principal case is
contrary to the general rule, but the law which it applied has been previously
recognized in Massachusetts,' Georgia' and New Jersey. These jurisdictions
advance the theory that the vendor, a competent party, has a right to so contract
that the excluding clause relates to the whole transaction, and the vendee cannot
later explain if he has failed to protect himself by not inserting the representations in the contract. While much may be said for this view, it is felt that the
majority rule is the better law. Since fraud has tainted the whole transaction,
since misrepresentation has been resorted to to persuade the entry into the contract, the law should not aid in carrying out the fraud by declaring that the
insertion of a clause excluding representations should be an absolute bar to the
vendee who has been defrauded by a reliance upon prior misrepresentations.
WmLS-CONSTRUCTION-MEANING OF "FIRST RIGHT"--The testatrix devised to her oldest daughter the "first right" to her home. The devisee entered
and took possession of the property described, and now claims the fee. Held:
The language used was insufficient to pass a fee. Estate of Louisa Gerhern,
88 Pa. Super. 530 (r926).
1

Jordan v. Nelson, 178 N. W. 544 (Iowa, I92O); Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143
N. Y. 424, 38 N. E. 458 (1894) ; Case Threshing Machine Co. v. McKay, I6I
N. C. 584, 77 S. E. 848 (1913).
'Whiting v. Squeglia, 70 Calif. App. io8, 232 Pac. 986 (1924); Thompson
Co. v. Schroeder, 131 Minn. 125, 154 N. W. 792 (1915) ; Dieterich v. Rice, 115
Wash. 365, 197 Pac. I (1921).
2 O'Meara v. Smyth, 243 Mass. I88, 137 N. E. :294 (1922); Boss v. Boston
Mortgage Co.; 251 Mass. 455, 146 N. E. 686 (1925).
'Equitable Mfg. Co. v. Biggers, 121 Ga. 381, 49 S. E. 271 (19o4) ; Morgan
v. Denton, 28 Ga. App. 88, i1O S. E. 328 (1921).
'Edison Fixture Co. v. Copoulos, 127 AtI. 551 (N. J. 1925).
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In determining what the testatrix intended, the court was greatly influenced by
the use of the word "first" in the phrase "first right." In an early New York
case' it was decided that a testator who devised his "right" in land passed all of
his interest therein, including a fee if he had one. But the word "first," appearing
in the principal case as a qualification of the riglit devised, seems to indicate that
there were other rights, secondary to this one to the home. The court here being
the first to be faced with the question of what passes by a devise of the "first
right" to realty, arrived at the conclusion that the devisee was entitled to a prior
right to purchase the real estate described at its fair value, i. e., the value to be
ascertained by an appraisement, with the obligation to account to the estate for the
value thereof.2 This conclusion has the effect of saying that as to this particular real estate the testatrix died intestate, and, although it is contrary to the general presumption that one leaving a will purports to dispose of his entire estate,it is nevertheless submitted that the court correctly carried out the intent of the
testatrix.
'Newkerk v. Newkerk, 2 Caines, 345 (N. Y. 1805).
' This procedure is provided for in the Fiduciaries Act of I9x7, P. L. 447,
§ 33, Pa. Stat. § 8543.
'Jones v. Gane, 205 Mass. 37, 91 N. E. 129 (191o) ; Brown v. Quintard,
79 App. Div. 635, 81 N. Y. Supp. 918 (2d Dept. I9O3) ; Long v. Hill, 29 Pa.
Super. 6o6 (905).

